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· atism. Johnson's death was m1expected. In 
4,he traveled to New York for jaw surgery; 
after the painful procedure, he died, appar-
"exhaustion." 
·. G. Morgai1, Justice William Johnson, tf1e First 
·r: T1·ie Career and Constitutional Philosopf1y of a 
·an Judge (1954). 
SANDRA F. V ANilURKLEO 
ONANDGRAHAM'SLESSEEv.MCIN-
8 Wheat. (21 U.S.) 543 (1823), argued 17 
3, decided 10 Mar. 1823 by vote of 7 
arshall for the Court. This was the first 
· ..e Court case to define the legal relation-
·*Native Americans to the United States. It 
1775 when the Piankeshaws ceded land 
,. is to a group of speculators, including 
"Johnson. 1-Iowever, Virginia in 1783 con-
0. the federal government its Illinois claims 
:public domain. 
.~18 William Mcintosh bought from the 
.?tates 11,560 acres of Illinois land that were 
Johnson's purchase. These same lands were 
by Joshua Johnson and his son, Thomas 
, and they brought an ejecbnent action 
Mcintosh. After losing in the lower courts, 
and Graham appealed. 
upreme Court, in a unanimous decision 
y Chief Justice John *Marshall, found 
osh. Marshall held that the principle of 
gave European nations an absolute right 
World lands. Once established, Native 
s had only a lesser right of occupancy 
d be abolished. Marshall also fonnd 
United States acquired title to Native 
lands tlu·ough Great Britain's conquest. 
enly declared that a conquered people's 
roperty could not be applied to Native 
. s because Indians were "fierce nomadic 
(p. 590). 
dians could not transfer lands to 
ls, such as William Johnson, or to nations 
the United States. Subsequent decisions 
eme Court eroded Mcintosh, although 
: n has yet to be specifically overruled. 
}OHN R. WUNDER 
v. DE GRANDY, 512 U.S. 997 (1994), 
l.1993, decided 30Jnne1994 by vote of 
.ter for the Court, O'Connor concurring, 
_{)ncurring in part and concurring in the 
:Thomas and Scalia in dissent. 
. e Supreme Court's first voting rights 
'Shaw v. Reno (1993), De Grandy 
challenge by groups of Hispanic 
~oter? to Florida's redistricting of 
0 
s (Miami) state legislative districts 
. census. The plaintiffs argued that 
ting plan violated section 2 of the 
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*Voting Rights Act of 1965 by diluting minority 
voting strength. Y ct the plan yielded functional 
proportionality in Dade County by providing 
a proportion of majority-minority districts that 
roughly equaled the proportion of t11e minority 
voting-age population. 
The plaintiffs specifically argued t11at more 
majority-minority districts could have been drawn 
had the legislature not lessened mh1ority voting 
power by packing minority voters into districts 
in some instances and cracking minority voting 
strei1gth by dividing cohesive minority popula-
tions among multiple districts h1 other instances. 
The federal district court found that Florida's fail-
ure to create as many majority-minority districts 
as possible necessarily yielded a section 2 viola-
tion. In response, the Supreme Court reiterated 
the totality-of-the-circumstances test, finding that 
the plaintiffs' evidence was insufficient to establish 
vote dilution in substantial measure because the 
plan provided rough proportionality for minority 
groups h1 the Dade Connty area. Justices Clarence 
*Thomas and Antonin *Scalia dissented on the 
grounds that an apportionment plan is not subject 
to section 2 challenge. 
De Grandy reiterated that districting is more 
art than science and stressed that voting rights 
violations do not always flow from proof of certain 
background facts. Though the Court's analysis cut 
against the minority plah1tiffs in De Grandy, its 
general thrust would later benefit minority voters 
in cases such as Easley v. Cro1nartie (2001). 
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JOHNSON v. LOUISIANA, 400 U.S. 356 (1972), 
argued 1 Mar. 1971, reargued 10 Jan. 1972, 
decided 22 May 1972 by vote of 5 to 4; White 
for the Court, Blackmun ru1d Powell concurring, 
Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, and Stewart in 
dissent. The issues in Johnson, and its companion 
case Apodaca v. Oregon (1972), which had been 
left unresolved· by *Duncan v. Louisiana (1968), 
were whether the ~·Fourteenth Amendment due 
process and equal protection clauses required 
states to observe *jury unanimity in criminal cases, 
as is required in the federal courts. A jury had 
convicted Johnson of robbery by a 9-to-3 vote. 
Since Johnson's trial began before Duncan was 
decided, and that ruling had not been applied 
retroactively, its *Sixth Amendment protections 
were not available . 
Johnson contended that he had been denied due 
process because a nonunanimous verdict meant 
the reasonable-doubt standard of guilt had not 
been met. The fact that three jurors disagreed with 
the verdict indicated doubt, and the nine-person 
majority could not have voted conscientiously in 
favor of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
